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1

The
OCCURRENCE AND SIGNIFICANCE
of
'MEANINGLESS EXPERIENCE1
Introduction
Experience, as the term is ased in mach of
current psychology, is assumed to he intrinsical
ly meaningful. Ogden’s stand that "there are no
meaningless experiences" (13, p. 227) and that of
Gault and Howard (7, p. 285) that "meaning is an
intrinsic aspect of each and every item of our
experience" serve to illustrate the most prevalent
attitude. In opposition to. this view, John Dewey
has advanced the theory that experience is mean
ingless at times. This paper is the outcome of
an attempt to elaborate and substantiate his claim,
and to indicate the significance of ’meaningless
experience’ for psychology. The investigation is
undertaken in an effort to make the concept of
experience more adequate and explicit for psycho
logy than we believe has generally been done.
The Occurrence of ’Meaningless Experience’
Dewey distinguishes two types or levels of
consciousness:
(l) The psycho-physical level,
or that of meaningless experience--which is illus
trated in the case of at least most animal experi
ence, in the newborn infant, and, at times, approx-,
imately if not completely in the grown man. (2)
The mental level or that of meaningful experience.
(3, p. 303). Before this theory can be clearly
understood, Dewey's notion of meaning must be pres
ented. Briefly it is that meaning is the pointing
function which some experiences have in referring
to something beyond themselves. The meaningless ex-

periences are thus those which do not have this
pointing function, that is, they are immediate
qualities or immediately given experiences— re
ferring to nothing beyond themselves. By way of
illustration, meaning in the infant is at first
the relationship between immediate qualities, and
only later, a relationship between meanings, or
between immediate qualities and meanings.
Before proceeding further, the concept of im
mediate qualities must be made free from obscurity.
Comparison with a physical object as such may be
of some aid to this end. For example, an object
which has never been a matter of experience in any
way is a mere existence; it is a bare event;-it
just iss.^ Now, an experience in its immediacy is
as meaningless at the time it is had as is such an
object. An experience of this character is mean
ingless for the reason that it mates no specific
connections with an apperceiving mass which has
been made by the influence of previous experience.
Among recent critic® of the immediate quality
concept, is Singer (17, p. 171), who contends that
quality is a matter of difference between experi
ences, and so, is. not immediate. In reply we may
say that he is identifying quality and meaning,
for the quality of an experience is the experience
in its self-enclosed immediacy, while meaning in
its first estate refers to a relationship between
qualities, that is, between immediate experiences.
What, if not qualities, go to make "differences” ,
possible Singer does not say. He fails to observe
that instead of the differences making the quali
ties, the variance in qualities makes possible
*This statement carries with it an acceptance
of Dewey’s (3, chap. 3) refutation of teleology as
being an empirical fact. It assumes neither accept
ance nor denial of teleology as a super-empirical
possibility, being purely an empirical interpreta
tion. It accepts mechanism as an empirical fact
but not as an absolute explanation of things.

3

"differences." He fails to observe that if an ex
perience in its immediacy has no quality, (one
might say no ’properties’) it cannot be seen in
relation to other experiences to take on what he
calls "quality."
Singer should never have become involved in
a confusion of quality and meaning had he taken
the genetic approach in his endeavor to arrive at
the nature of meaning. Obvious as is the wisdom
of this approach, it has not been given due recog
nition in current theory. It is with'this last
fact in mind that the present dissertation con
tends that the answer to so simple a question as
"Koes experience become more meaningful as one
matures?" offers an entering wedge which promises
to pry into the secrets of the meaning problem.
How, does experience become more meaningful
as one proceeds from infancy to maturity? Cer
tainly no psychologist would do such violence to'
fact as to deny this growth, but an implication
which has not been taken account of by those main
taining the intrinsic meaningfulness of conscious
ness is this: The newborn babe is as undeniably
conscious as are his parents, and yet, to endow
him with equal meaningfulness of experience is
extremely far-fetched in view of what we know of
the growth of meanings.• This query suggests the
difference between the mere fact of consciousness
and meaningful consciousness.
The difference between this genetic view
point and that of the intrinsic meaningfulness
of consciousness is well illustrated in the fol
lowing statement by Ivlunsterberg (11, p. 161): "A
word which we hear, a picture' which we see, a tool
which we grasp, has meaning for us when the sense
impression fuses with associations which indicate
its relations." How, when one reflects upon this
conception, one wonders just where, when, and how
the newborn infant came into possession of associa
tions to indicate the relationships of his first
conscious experience. For, when one thing means
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another, there is a relationship between two ex
periences which one has had in conscious life.
From the genetic point of view it seems rea
sonable to suppose that the first conscious res
ponses of the child as purely impulsive, only
taking on meaning when some relationship is seen
between some of. them. Before any relationship
6an be observed between the conscious experiences
of the impulsive plane, they must occur in a cer
tain sequential order so that in time the experi
encing being may observe that one experience bears
a certain relation to another and thus can mean
that experience. That is to say, an infant with
the ordinary equipment for experiencing would
never acquire any meanings if it were possible to
place him under conditions so that he could never
note any sequential order of events, for, if his
experiences could be so radically varied in res
pect to the order in which they occur that no two
experiences could ever be observed to have any
relationship to each other, the infant would never
experience a meaning though he might have ever so
many experiences. Briefly, without recurrent se
quences of experiences, no meanings could develop.
The emphasis of much of current psychology
upon adult introspection has thus led it to ignore
an important phase of the meaning problem— that of
the subjective side of the infant’s life. For ex
ample, the statement of Pillsbury (15, p. 5) that
psychology "takes into consideration nothing that
is not to be discovered by the individual who re
members” apparently ignores the subjective side of
the babe's mental life. Now, to omit from consid
eration such genuine psychological subject-matter
would seem to be neglecting an essential phase of
experience. Accordingly, recognition must be made
of the fact that there are other mental contents
with which we should deal in psychology besides
those of individuals who have a system of meanings
sufficiently complex that they can introspect and
describe them. The response to impulse as a sub
jective factor must, therefore, be given its right-

fu.1 place in psychology if the nature of meaning
is not to he misconstrued.
We next consider the thesis that grown man
can have meaningless experiences. Comparison of
the human with the animal response in certain
situations may throw some light upon the problem.
In this regard, most psychologists will agree that
the dog in savagely devouring a piece of meat is
simply exercising direct response to stimulus as
is conceded to he the case in most animal behav
ior. In such direct response there can be nothing
1X1 G O H 3 C 1 OU.SX10 3 S S3CC epting quality.
To attribute
to it meaning, that is, reference to something be
yond itself, would seem to be reading into it the
content of human experience. How, a starving man
seems to approximate having this level of experi
ence during the first moments of partaking of food.
Individuals dying of thirst also illustrate the
condition of undergoing most intense quality and
a negligible amount (if any) meaning. (It may be
recalled that such examples as these last are given
by some writers as the nearest approximations of
"pure instinct" in adult human experience.)
Professors Cole and Smith have described ilium
inating instances of such approximations of mean
ingless experience. Professor Cole writes (2, p.
147): "During a lecture to a large class in psy
chology there was a sudden, deep, roaring, ominous
noise directly over the heads of the students. For
part of the minute they sho?/ed a sudden, startled
surprise and even fear. Note-taking stopped and
instinctively everyone straightened up. Then just
as suddenly these expressions ceased, tension re
laxed, and the noise was recognized as snow slid
ing from the roof. The first moment was one of
sensation and strange, surprising sensation, the
second was one of perception of the object, snow."
Professor Cole believes that during the first mo
ment a "pure sensation" was had. We can agree that
an approximation of pure sensation or meaningless
experience was had, but withhold affirmation, at
least tentatively, that pure meaninglessness was
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experienced. An equally interesting experience
is told by Professor P. 0. Smith of the University
of Montana. While reading on a porch daring a
summer day he was startled by a sudden sound from
an adjoining room. Perhaps the first moment was
characterized by meaningless experience, since it
vaguely seems to have been a mere T,startled aware
ness." Realization that the sensation was strange
and auditory followed almost immediately, and,
very gradually, fragments of the meaning of the
sound to him were assembled until he knew that he
had heard the tone of a violin. The thrill of
watching a meaning so strikingly unfold made an
indelibile impression upon his mind. Now, it would
seem that we need not hesitate to admit the first
moment of Professor Smith’s experience to have
been an approximation of meaninglessness, but we
should hesitate to dogmatically assert it to be
totally meaningless.
The following experience of the writer may
serve as further illustration: Por years it has
been his habit to conclude bathing by sliding to
his back in the tub and basking in the heat of the
water. After a short time all meaning seems to
have disappeared due to the dulling effect of the
heat and all associations seem to have stopped.
The condition is in no sense that of being uncon
scious or asleep and the slang phrase that there
is "nobody home" perhaps affords its most adequate
description. There seems to be an abundance of
quality, but it may be doubted whether there is
any meaning at all.
Such instances make clear certain manifesta
tion of approximate meaningless experience in the
adult. It now remains to note that our problem is
centered about the question whether or not quality
can be experienced at any given degree of vividness
without a proportionate amount of meaning. In this
connection, if consciousness is intrinsically mean
ingful, an individual must always be experiencing
meaning to the extent that his consciousness is
vivid. But there seems to be evidence to show that
this is not true. Por instance, as was mentioned
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"befora, the infant is as truly conscious as is the
add.lt in spite of its poverty of meanings. And
observation of the behavior of the infant would
seem to show that his consciousness is as vivid as
that of the adult. (A familiar example of this is
the satisfaction an infant seems to derive from
nursing.) Apparently, then, grown man has approx
imately meaningless experience since he seems to
have certain experiences which are very vivid but
are not proportionately meaningful.
Having our best evidence of approximations of
meaningless experience, in the adult, under unusu
al conditions, we have devised the following ex
periment in an effort to determine whether they
take place in more ordinary waking life, and if so,
to study the manner of their occurrence:
An Experimental Study
of
Approximately Meaningless Experience
Eleven subjects were used in the experiment
of which the general method of procedure was as
follows: With the subject and the experimenter
sitting one meter apart and face-to-face, the ex
perimenter pronounced a word in a whisper with each
beat of a metronome which was placed in an adjoin
ing room so that its beats at intervals of one sec
ond would not afford a distraction for the subject.
The subject was ordered to slide his hand (which
was placed palm down upon a table) about an inch
to the left when the word no longer had meaning
and to slide the hand back again when the meaning
returned. At this time the experimenter made a
short mark above a horizontal line with each beat
of the metronome during which the hand signified
presence of meanings and a mark below the line with
each beat of the metronome signified as lacking ( )
meaning. The experiment was continued with each of
ten words until the meaning had departed and re
turned ten times— the subject being instructed not
to exert himself overmuch to keep the meanings but
rather to allow them to flow about the stimulus
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word as freely as possible. The words— mother, up,
mind, even, Kelly, truth, and, much, because, and
nothing— were selected in order to vary the meaning
content. Precaution was taken to maintain room
temperature v/hieh was not conducive to drowsiness
and to ascertain that the subject was in an easy
posture. After some distraction occurred because
of open eyes during the initial part of the experi
ment, the subjects were henceforth instructed to
close their eyes gently. No subject was used if
at all fatigued, or for more than an hour at a sit
ting. On an average of between two and three words
were used in an hour, although in some cases but
one word was finished in this time.
The technique of moving the hand was neces
sary in order that the experimenter might have an
objective record of the frequency and distribution
of the various mental phenomena. Prom the outset,
no hope was held out for the discovery of complete
ly meaningless experiences— the purpose of the ex
periment being to study approximations of meaning
less experience in an ordinary condition of waking
life. To instruct the subject to move his hand
was an incidental matter of method in educating
the subjects to the purpose of the research, since
all were "green" insofar as the abstruse problem
of meaning was concerned. Most of the subjects
noted the intentional fallacy in the stated direc
tions before having concluded with the first of
the ten words, and moved their respective hands
when the meaning seemed very dim, or after certain
momentary lapses of consciousness to which they tes
tified as having occurred. Therefore, it is plain
that this technique detracts in no way from the
value of the introspective reports. (In this con
nection, it is interesting to note that several of
the subjects testified that many of their "movings
of the hand" were, insofar as they could determine
by introspection, not consciously motivated.)
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Results: Three types of phenomena were revealed in
the experiment, one of clear meanings, one
of
lapses of consciousness, or blankness, and an
"intermediate'! type which was characterized by
either extremely vagu.e meanings or a feeling of
confusion. All of the subjects excepting three
testified to experiences which may be classified'
under each of these heads, and, as might' be ex-'
pected, the three exceptions failed to observe com
plete lapses of consciousness.
Testimony as to the occurrence of complete
lapses of consciousness is as follows*.
.M. Ivl. : I did not "get the idea" until sever-,
al words had been used, but thereafter I observed
in each word from one to five complete "gaps” of
?i?hieh I was only conscious afterward and from
which I could recall no quality. Insofar as I can ■
estimate the periods seem to have lasted but a
second or two for the most part. One period from’
which I was "brought out” by the splash of an '
automobile through a puddle was much longer than
the rest. I am never aware of such periods until'
they are over.
. L. F. : I lost all consciousness for a flash
on one occasion.
M. C.: Only in four of the words did I have
meaningless experiences but all' instances except
ing one of these were also qualityless. In this
one case I have a.feeling that somehow the period
wasn't empty.
F. E.: I had a number of seemingly blank
periods but they were too short to permit observa
tion of their characteristics— if they had any.
When I am suddenly aware that a "blank" has flashed,
there is a jumble of content in my consciousness,
that is, nothing is organized momentarily. One of
these gaps felt like a distinct hole in my con-
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sciousness— like an unbridged gap,
F. W . : I believe that I had one completely
empty period daring the fifty word (Kelly) I
suddenly had a meaning that there had. been no con
tent to my consciousness. I was exceedingly wide
awake during this particular part of the experi
ment.
1. U.': There seems to me to be three dis
tinct phases of experience in this experiment:
(l) Association (2) Mere awareness of stimulus (3)
Blankness. I always moved my hand upon becoming
suddenly conscious that I had passed through a
blank period and then generally relapsed back in
to almost meaninglessness which as well as I can
gell is a state of awareness of stimulus without
any associations. Once, intense and rapid assoc
iations came into my mind and it was several mo
ments before it occurred to me that I had "come
out" of a blank period. In another instance I was
at the height of meaningful experience; and later
I was conscious that a gap must have suddenly in
tervened between the period I was then in and the
colorful meanings which were present a moment be
fore. This last, is the first time that I have
been able to notice a seemingly abrupt transition
into a completely blank period. This "gap" phe
nomenon is usually momentary when it takes place
in my ordinary experiences.
S. S.: When I try to introspect the content
of those gaps I find nothing to introspect. I
have a feeling that there has been a gap but cannot
see what bridged the gap— I cannot see, how I got
started again where I left off. In one instance I
recalled a feeling of exertion but I am not sure
whether this feeling came immediately after or
during the period. I am not sure that I do not
have a tendency to read meaning into what may be
- mere quality at the time it is had. When the as
sociations came to an end I have a completely
blank period. While studying my lessons I often
notice these gaps and am unable to attribute any
content to them.
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W. 0.; It is difficult for me to be sure,
but I think that I did have one or two flashes of
complete blankness during the tenth word..
Note: .The remaining three subjects failed
to appreciate the objective of the experiment and
contributed no introspections of value to the
problem.

In the light of these results we have evi
dence that in our normal conscious life uncon
scious periods seem* to occur which vary from mere
flashes which are difficult to identify, to per
iods of several seconds. Insofar as introspection
can determine, such periods are "contentless."
However, it is not unthinkable that they may pos
sess content, but that such content cannot be re
called since only meanings can be recalled.
In
this last case the content would be immediate qual
ity. Reference to the introspective reports re
veals a wide range of individual differences in
respect to the frequency of the occurrence of the.
"gaps." Since these "gaps" must be seen in rela
tion to other phenomena brought out in the experi
ment before their full significance can be under
stood, we shall now proceed with a discussion of
the phenomena most closely related to them— -which •
we shall call the "intermediate" type.
How, the relation betv/een the "gaps" and the
"intermediate" phenomena becomes more plain when
it is known that the latter immediately follows
the- "gaps" practically every time that they (the
"gaps") occur. The three probably most expert
subjects agree with subject S. S. when he says,
"I think that the really blank period takes place
every time between the' cessation of association
and the period of confusion, but sometimes it is
so short as to cause me to doubt whether it oc
curred or not." In fact, only on one occasion
did a subject testify that he "came out" of a "gap"

12

and fell so immediately on to a line of vivid as
sociations that he noticed no "intermediate" or,
in this case, adjustment period, W. 0., a mature
student, was the one apparent exception insofar
as having noted that the intermediate periods
usually follow "gaps" is concerned. Reference
to the introspections on "gaps" will show that
she was in doubt as to whether she had any "gaps"
at all. But, she had very distinct "intermediate"
periods, all of which she described as periods of
confusion. However, in the average case, these
confusion periods sometimes followed discernible
"gaps" and sometimes they.either did not follow
"gaps" or else the "gaps" were too short to be
recognized.
Another type of experience which we have pat
into the "intermediate" class for convenience was
that of -mere vagaeness of meaning when quality
seemed to be proportionately vagae. Most of the
subjects testified that the majority of their "in
termediate" periods were of this type, but there
were marked individual .differences in this respect.
The characteristics of the periods labelled
"intermediate" may best be illustrated by the fol
lowing typical introspections:
(l) "During such
periods I am only aware of the dull beating of the
stimulus." ('2) "The meaning that I was trying to
think about the meaning characterized most of these
periods." (3) "It is a period of confusion during
which one is trying to get back to the associations
again— a period when the content of consciousness
is in a jumble and one has no definite meanings."
(4) "The only meaning was that there was no mean
ing." (5) "Meanings seem to be trying to make
themselves clear." (6) "I feel as I feel when a
’Prof.’ asks me a question and I don’t know the
answer— kind of blank and groping for a meaning."
(7) "Back in my consciousness there is always a
dim awareness that meanings are the object of the
experiment." (8) "There is an awareness of stim
ulus without any association."
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All of the eleven subjects testified to hav
ing experienced one or both of the types which
we have placed in the "intermediate,r category.
The introspections listed above are merely illus
trations of the different kinds of replies made—
most of the subjects having made statements at
different times which were substantially the same
as several of those quoted. Briefly, however,
the statements may be summarized by saying that
at times these periods seem to have been but lulls
in the vividness of me'aning, while at other times
they were periods of confusion, of indefinite and
confused meaning, of readjustment and attempt to
force some definite meaning out of a chaos of con
tent. The periods which were merely dim perhaps
afford little evidence of meaningless experience
since the lack of quality in such experiences was
testified to be about as pronounced as the lack
of vividness in the meaning. But, when it is re
flected upon that the subjects observe their per
iods of confusion to consist of bewildering my
riads of experiences, and that these periods were
said to have had content far out of proportion to
the meaning present, we have some evidence in sup
port of Dewey’s (3, p. 221) contention-that such
periods are approximations of meaninglessness.
(These seem to be the periods that Dewey (4, chap.
1) in his book "How We. Think," designates as the
first of five steps in reflective thinking. He
calls this step that of a ’felt difficulty.')
Conclusion of Experiment;
Our specific conclusions are:
1.
That the results point to the con
clusion that experiences occur in our ordinary
waking life which approximate meaningless experi
ence.
2_. That momentary lapses of conscious
ness take place in ordinary waking life, and that
when the individual suddenly "comes out" of one of
these he finds himself in a state of mental eonfu-

14

sion,'' from which -he does not emerge until he begins
to see relations.
3.
That such periods of confusion either
do not follow "gaps" in consciousness in some ca
ses, or else the "gaps" are too short to he dis
cernible.
4,. That the "gaps" are either lapses of
consciousness or else true meaningless experiences
which cannot be recalled since only meanings can
be recalled.
_5. That the approximations of meaning- ’
less experTence brought oat usually follow a dis
tinct "gap" in consciousness, and-are themselves
followed by a. period of ordinary .associations—
that is, by ordinary meaningful experience.
6. That different individuals vary great
ly as to the time elapsing between the successive
occurrences of the various phenomena brought out in
the experiment.

We conclude, then, that we have found evidence
of the occurrence of approximations of meaningless
experience in the ordinary waking life of the adult
and we have discovered some of the factors influenc
ing its occurrence.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 'MEANINGLESS EXPERIENCE*
What, then, are the implications of these re
salts for psychology? What significant hearing do
they hare apon the definition of the major con
cepts of the science of psychology— such as a
definition of psychology itself, of mind, of con
sciousness, of perception, of the odea,, of the im
age, and of sensory data? What is the possible
desirability of a reconstruction of the fundamen
tal concepts of psychology at which we may arrive?
Now, we may best answer the last question first.
In other words, just, what pragmatic value is there
for a reconstruction of the fundamental concepts
of psychology;or for finding a more accurate em
pirical basis for them? Tersely, even though we
were unable to predict the practical consequences,
such a reconstruction has a theoretical justifica
tion since the "pure" science generally precedes
the applied. And, any concepts which more accu
rately describe the empirical facts should ulti
mately facilitate the handling of such facts.
The present thesis maintains that psychology
is the science of experiencing, and as such includes
both meaningful and meaningless experiences
in
spite of the fact that the latter may not be in
trospective material in their pure state.
The
legitimacy of meaningful experience as subject
matter in a science will not be contested, but, it
may be asked, how can meaningless experience, as
such, at the time it is had, is indefinable, be
subject matter of psychology? It is replied that
experience in its immediacy (meaningless experience)
is the initial 'stuff’ which, when relationships’
are seen between its different occurrences, takes
on meaning. And, that any definition is but a com
posite of meanings which takes cognizance-‘
‘of the
primeval 'stuff’ from which they spring, and not a

definition of immediate experience as such; Hence,
we are justified in using immediate experience as
subject matter of psychology.
Next, what is the bearing of meaningless ex
perience upon the definition of ’mind1? Upon this
point perhaps we can do. no better than to quote
Dewey (5, pp. 271, 278, 274, 276) who writes, ’’The
conclusion seems inevitable that since mind does
not appear, in the original list of instincts, it
represents something acquired." "It is a forma
tion, not a datum; a product and a cause only af
ter it has been produced." "Instincts become
mind when they are organized, and directed with
reference to the ends;of attention, esteem, and
endeavor which are supplied by the shared life of
the place and time. The hind of mind they become
depends upon the kind of objects of attention
which the specific social conditions supply."
Thus, a human mind is seen to consist of the sys- :
tem of meanings which the individual has acquired■
as the result of an interaction between,his pe
culiar innate capacity and his peculiar environ
ment. And, accordingly,'insofar as the animal
can see consequences before they actually occur;
insofar as his responses are not directly to
stimuli, he may be said to possess mind; while,
insofar as they are direct responses to stimuli,
they must be considered as on. the biological level
rather than as upon the mental plane. Thus, ’mind
which, as we have seen, is a system of meanings,
is evolved from a basis of meaningless experiences
And, accordingly, ’mind’ is not inclusive of all
the subject matter of psychology, as is often as
sumed.
Consideration of "consciousness" logically
follows. Before attempting to show the implica
tions of meaningless experience for consciousness
we shall try to make our own theory more under
standable by a few quotations from, the writings
of John Dewey. Professor Dewey pictures the dif
ference between meaningless and meaningful con
sciousness in saying (3, p. 313) that whenever
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meaningful consciousness occurs "there is a ’mom
ent1 of hesitation; there are scruples, reserva
tions, in complete overt action." (By "complete
overt action" Dewey means direct response to
stimulus, which, on its subjective side, calls
for meaningless experience.) Then again, (3, p.
343) "But the view of complete separation of
existential consciousness (immediate conscious
ness) from connection with physical things cannot
be maintained in view of what is known if its
specifiable connections with organic conditions,
and of the intimate unbroken connection of organ
ic with extra-organic events." In this sentence
he suggests that there is no specifiable point in
nature at which we are justified in dogmatically
asserting consciousness to make its appearance.
When one reflects upon meaningless consciousness
as perhaps .extending in some way even to the in
organic one can "feel" the notion of meaningless
experience even though he cannot describe it. A
particularly clarifying discussion is the follow
ing^, p. 336): "It is usual in current psycholo
gy to assert.or assume that qualities observed are
those of the stimulus. This assumption puts the
cart before the horse; qualities which are observed
are those attendant upon response to stimuli. We
are observantly aware (in distinction from inferentially aware) only of what has been done; we can
perceive what is already there, what has happened."
Here, Professor Dewey has shown that what we are
conscious of is our response to the stimulus and
not the stimulus in its immediacy. He has further
implied that we are conscious (meaningfully) of an
experience in its immediacy only after it has oc
curred and it is only in immediate experience or
meaningless consciousness that we are directly
conscious of a stimulus.
We are now naturally "led to a discussion of
theories of "consciousness"--the term which, as
Titchener says (18, p. 17) "has many meanings."
We cannot attempt a complete critique on the sub
ject, but it is, however, incumbent upon us that
we take cognizance of the two most widely accepted
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definitions. These are: (1) that consciousness
is a state of awareness, and (2) that conscious
ness is a cross-section of mind--mind being con
ceived of as the sum-total of mental processes
occurring during the lifetime of an individual.
We shall, then, attempt,to indicate the difficul
ties of these most typical of current definitions,
and to point out how meaningless experience will
meet them.
Three able champions of the theory that -eon-,
sciousness is a state of awareness are Warren, Angell, and Dunlap. Warren (20, p. 122) says that
"consciousness is one of those facts of which we
are all aware but cannot define"— that it is
a
state of awareness. Angell (l, p. l) says, "Con
sciousness we can only define in terms' of itself.
Sensations, ideas, pains, pleasures, acts of mem
ory, imagination, and will--these may serve to
illustrate the experience's we mean to indicate by *
the term; and our best endeavor to construct a
successful definition results in some such list,
of which we can only say: These taken together
are all we can mean by consciousness." And, Dun
lap writes, (6, p. 22) "Consciousness .as precisely
uged in psychology means merely awareness of some
thing, ,and wherever we find the word consciousness
we can substitute perfectly the word awareness."
In other words, Dunlap would also define con
sciousness in terms of itself since he would de
fine it in terms of its synonym. How, in view of
the fact that a definition consists of describing
an object in terms of other objects (3, p. 284)
and not in describing the thing in itself, we
must conclude that the above definitions are not
definitions at all. Having noted this fact,
wherein does meaningless experience have impli
cations for it? Specifically, we have been able
to legitimately define consciousness on its mean
ingful level as the process of acquiring a new
meaning. And although, as Dewey says, (3, p. 307)
"It is impossible to tell what immediate conscious
ness is,"-— we can be means of inference arrive at
a conclusion that the primary data of experience
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are such unrelated experiences. Consequently, we
have been able to define ordinary meaningful con
sciousness and have been able to point to the
'something' from which it is developed.
We are now r^ady to indicate the bearing of
meaningless experience Upon the 'cross-section of
mind' theory which has been so ably championed by
Titchener. At the outset it will be clear that
this theory is closely analogous to ours. Where
as, we have defined mind as the system of mean
ings which an individual has acquired during his
lifetime, Titchener has described it as "the sumtotal of mental processes occurring during one's '
lifetime." And, whereas, we have defined meaning
ful consciousness as the process of having a new
meaning, he has described it as a cross-section
of the mind-stream. Titchener observed that the
first experiences of a child are meaningless but
this fact does not deter him from implicitly as
suming that for most practical purposes only adult
introspections are of consequence. This last is
illustrated when he says that (19, p. 104) "aware
ness is of two principal kinds: awareness of
meaning, and awareness of relation." For this
statement clearly limits consciousness to meaning
fulness since, according to the present thesis,
it might as well be stated as follows:."conscious
ness is of two principal kinds: consciousness of
meaning and consciousness of relation (which is
merely a type of meaningful consciousness). Now,
bearing in mind the fact that most of our mental
life is in the sphere of meanings, and that Titch
ener' s definitions of mind and consciousness are
virtually the same as ours, we must conclude that
recognition of the true significance of the mean
ingless experience concept would seem to be pri
marily of theoretical value to him insofar as con
sciousness itself is concerned.
After having reflected Upon the preceding ap
plications of meaningless consciousness, the con
ception should be more tangible to us and its ird—
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plications for the interesting problem involved
in Munsterberg's definition of consciousness may
be brought out with little difficulty. Munster berg (12, p. 4) says that consciousness is an ab
straction from sensations, volitions, ideas, imag
es,. .-and feelings. How, since all scientific terms
are abstractions, we agree that consciousness as
a term of psychology must be an abstraction, but
the concept of meaningless experience demands that
we recognize a consciousness which is not an ab
straction and this is the immediate fact of con
sciousness, or meaningless experience.
Having indicated the significance of meaning
less experience for consciousness, a discussion
normally follows of its relation to what has of
ten been called the ,Tatom of psychology"— that is,
the sensation or "sensory data." In the main
body of this thesis we have, in effect, discussed
much of what might be said on the subject with
out mentioning 'sensations1 specifically. Mean
ingless experience, if accepted, involves a den
ial of sensations such as sounds, colors, etc.,
as being the 'atoms' of experience. The
real
'atoms' are said to be immediate experiences.
Professor Dewey (3, p. 327) defines sensations as'
follows: "Sensa are the class of irreducible
meanings which are employed in verifying and
correcting other me anings." For instance, the
experiencing of red is not a meaningless experi
ence for the reason that such an experience at
least has the meaning of being red. 'Redness' is
a concept and all concepts are embodiments of
meaning. As in the case of consciousness, sen
sations can be thought of as meaningful and mean
ingless. The'meaningless sensations are immedi
ate experiences while the meaningful sensations
are the most elementary meanings which we can use
in "verifying and correcting other meanings"--the
sensations of ordinary psychology.
We have said that 'sensory data' are not
meaningless experiences. How, James (8, p. 7),
Gault and Howard (7, p. 166), Gole (2, p. 147),
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and others, recognize the possibility of "pure
sensations" in early infanthood, hat they fail to
make explicit how extremely different these are
from the "sensations" of orthodox psychology,
likewise, they do not take cognizance of the im
plications of this difference to a psychology
which is to be consistent with empirical findings.
Some distinction between the "sensations" of the
adult and the "pare sensations" of the infant is
observed, bat the fact that herein lies the key
to the canses of mach psychological controversy
has escaped notice. That the primary data of ex
perience are immediate qualities is in effect ad
mitted and then the matter is dropped withoat any
significance of great import having been attached
to it.
A conception of sensation into which the con
cept of meaningless experience may easily be in
tro daced has been stated as follows by Gault and
Howard (7, p. 166): "We spoke of sensation in a
former chapter as a conscioasness of difference.
The brightness of the atmosphere about as at this
moment is different from that of a moment ago.
The conscioasness of this difference at the time
at which it appeared is a sensation. The coarse
of atmospheric vibrations to which we are accus
tomed as we sit in oar study as sharply altered,
and theib is, at that moment, another sensation:
this one of another quality— auditory. It is the
mere awareness of 'something there' that is dif
ferent from what was there a moment ago. What
that something is— we do not so much as have a
name for it." How, this reference shows clearly
how its authors explain the intrinsic meaningfulness of consciousness. They analyze exper
ience down to the most elementary meaning con
ceivable and dismiss any reference to the'some
thing' .between which differences are said to exist.
This 'something' is what we have called "immediate
quality" or meaningless experience.
As we have shown, 'sensations' are elementary
meanings. Then, it follows that 'sense-psrception’
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is a matter of experiencing sensations, that is,
of experiencing a type of meanings. The meaning
less experience concept, therefore, has little
hearing upon 1sense-perception’ upon its own ac
count. However, since there is often a confusion
of the larger sense of the term ’perception1 with
1sense-perception’ and meaningless experience has
implications for the former, we shall distinguish
them. Upon this point Professor Dewey says (3, p.
338) that ’’while the word ’perception’ may he
limited to designate awareness of objects contem
poraneously affecting the bodily organs, there is
no ground whatever for the assumption which has
usually attended this narrowing of the older mean
ing of the word: namely, that sense-perception
has intrinsic properties or qualities marking it
off from other forms of consciousness.” Here Pro
fessor Dewey is suggesting that the difference be
tween sense-perception and introspection (a lar
ger sense of the term ’perception’) is not due
to intrinsic properties since both are processes
of having meanings. How, the fact that meaning
ful consciousness denotes the process of acquir
ing a new meaning at once suggests that it is syn
onymous with perception when the latter is osed in
its most inclusive sense as including introspec
tion, sense-perception, etc. The concept of mean
ingless experience is thus seen to demand its
most revolutionary change for psychology in the
case of its identification of the time honored
concepts of•consciousness and perception.
Perception, of course, involves ideas and
images, the concepts to which meaningless experi
ence offers the least innovation. In our scheme,
an idea is a meaning, while the psychologists’
image as Pillsbury (16, p. 157) wrote long ago,
is but one meaning' among many. In other words, in
the sense in which the' term is generally used, an
image is but one of our many ideas. Our theory
renders service in that it emphasizes the fact
that whenever we are meaningfully conscious an
idea is present, since a meaning is present. And,
it is also of value in showing that an idea may
be the relationship between immediate qualities
in addition to its generally accepted connotation
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of the relationship between meanings. It is thus,
that meaningless experience indicates the occurrence
of ideas which are so simple that they probably
are not introspective material.
In further discussion of perception, it
should be said that the new 'Gestalt’ psychology,
which is primarily a theory of perception, may
make one of its principal contributions in fur
thering the notion of meaningless experience. For
the ’Gestalt’ implicitly accepts the implications
of this notion. For instance, Kohler (10, p. 193)'
suggests the concept when he speaks of "purely op
tical entities" becoming "imbued with meanings."
And then, the ’Gestalt's1 construction of our-react
ing to situations as a whole rather than in parts .
is clearly suggestive of our conclusion that con
sciousness or perceptive awareness is the process
of having a new meaning, for under our construction
we are inevitably reacting to whole situations
whenever we react.
Mention of ’Gestalt’ psychology is incomplete
without some suggestion of animal psychology— the
field to which it has made such noteworthy contri
butions. In this relation, study of the mental
processes of animals has long been a fascinating
sphere of psychology and for a long time many ani
mals were &iven credit for almost human powers.
The natural tendency to read human meanings into
the acts of animals finally led psychologists to
follow the’principle of parsimony’ 'in .judging ani
mal intelligence. The 'principle of parsimony’
was that in giving the animal credit for as little
understanding as possible under the circumstances,
the most nearly correct conclusion would most like
ly be had. Now, it remained for Kohler and his
'Gestalt' psychology to prove that the intelligence
of at least some of the higher animals had been
underrated. Even Professor Dewey has pursued the
customary fallacy. For instance, he says (3, p.
185), "The most convincing evidence that animals
do not 'think' is found in the fact that they have
no tools, but depend upon 'their own relatively-fixed
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bodily structures to effect results." Kohler (9),
in his book, "The Mentality of Apes," has convinc
ingly shown that the chimpanzee not only uses tools
bat constracts tools. He has shown that some ani
mals experience complex meanings, in contradiction
to the ontil recently carrent tendency to limit
animal mental functions to the reflex and condi
tioned reflex, that is, to implicitly accredit the
animal with no, or practically no, meanings. How,
accrediting some animals with meaningfal experience,
what is the bearing of meaningless experience upon
animal psychology? One point is that we can find no
point at which to say, "From here up:in the scale of
evolution, all animals have meaningfal experience,
while below this point only meaningless experiences
are had." Therefore, the transition must be a gradual
one. For the present, the 'Gestalt1 seems to offer
the most promise toward the narrowing of this zone
of uncertainty.
A second point is that animal
psychology is generally thought adequately explained
in terms of reflexes which have been studied prin
cipally from the behavioristic (obpctive) point of
view. And, since meaningless experience is the
subjective side of the cortical reflexes, we have
in this concept an explanation of the nature of the
much neglected subjective side of a large portion of
animal life.
There is no more fitting subject with which we
may conclude our treatment of meaningless experience
than that of its relation to meaning itself. We
have defined meaning as seeing relations between experiences rather than having the experiences in
their immediacy, and have shown that the newborn
infant has no meanings since ha has never experienced
anything in relation to something else. It is thus
that we have shown consciousness not to be intrin- .
sically meaningful. Titchener's (19, p. 175) state
ment that meaning is a matter of context, that is,
that experiences .have meaning only because of the background of previous experiences, is, of course,
identical with ours. And, -for— most practical purposes,

25-.this is the stand of psychologists in general,
in spite of the fact that some of them endeavor
to maintain the intrinsic meaningfa 1ne ss of c onscioasness. The one theory with which we shall'
take issiae is that of Professor .Dewey (3, Chap. 5).
Dewey contends that all meanings are acquired in
social situations and that since animals do not
have such situations their experiences are meaning
less.
(A social situation, he defines as seeing
things as a function in another's experience.)
Having in mind Kohler's experiments with apes one >
cannot accept the idea that all animal experience ’
is meaningless, and consequently mast either con
clude that meanings do not have to be acqaired in
social sitaations, or that animals have social
sithati on s.
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SUMMARY OF OOI’
TGLUglOM’S
This discussion has shown:
•1. That consciousness is not intrinsi
cally meaningful as is contended by many authori
ties and implicitly assumed for most practical
purposes by mosi} others^
2. That the newborn infant has .meaning
less experience;
3. That the adult approximates haying
meaningless experience and may actually have it;
4. That approximations of meaningless
experience occur in the adult in ordinary waking
life as well as in certain pmareiai conditions;
5. That though the occurrence of mean
ingless experience is not denied by some of the
prominent psychologists, no particular importance
has been assigned to it;
6. And, that acceptance of ’meaningless
experience’ has implications which necessitate a
redefinition of the fundamental terms of psycholo
gy-*

*The significance of ’meaningless experience*
for religion has been discussed by Wieman (21).
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